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BACKGROUND
There are many major economic focuses at work in the sector.  In late 2003, a start to
the herd building phase of the cattle cycle is imminent.  Export markets are coming back
after faltering during 2002, and beef demand, domestic and international, is growing again.
We have not seen the combination of heifer holdback to build the herd, which will reduce per
capita beef supplies, and increased demand for beef since the early 1970’s.  Unless corn
prices surge, and this is unlikely, calf prices will go above $1.00 and generally stay there for
the next several years—perhaps as long as 5 to 6 years.
As the supply-side cycle and resurgence in beef demand contribute their influences,
the organizational structure of the marketplace continues to change.  Quality grades in beef
have been outdated for 25 years.  Such important product attributes as tenderness have not
been brought into the grades, and that policy failure has ensured that the price driven system
could not be effective as a means of coordination and quality control.  Our meat scientist
colleagues were finding toughness problems in 20 to 25 percent of the Choice fresh cuts in
the 1980’s, and little progress has been made in more recent years.  Selling everything at one
average price each week does not give the producer any reason to change genetics and
management and marbling only explains about 30 percent of the variation in tenderness.
That simply is not good enough.  The first step the producer-initiated vertical alliances
typically take is to guarantee tenderness which is testimony to the importance of this quality
issue.  It is hard to have the consistently positive eating experience all of us want to see with
the beef consumer when the product failure rate in the form of “too touch to chew” is as high
as 25 percent.  The pricing mechanism could have provided the coordination and quality
control, perhaps, if grades had been modernized and technology adopted to get to individual
animal measurement and pricing.  But that did not happen, and we moved to non-price means
of coordination and quality control.
When the industry moved to the controversial non-price means of quality control like
vertical alliances and contracts, we saw a surge in the much needed investments in new
quality-assured and consumer-friendly product lines by the large packers.  I hope we don’t
cut off those new investments by passing laws to block the trends away from the failed price-
driven systems.  If we like price-driven systems, and I do, then we need time and energy
spent on modernizing the quality grades so the price-driven system would have a chance to
work, but I predict that will not happen.  About one-half of the cattle feeding sector is being
paid more than their cattle are worth, and they will not join in any consensus effort to get the
grades changed.   Remember the debate surrounding taking the B-maturity cattle out of the
Choice and Select grades?  Recognizing, then, that producers will get caught up in forced
change and controversy about policy and process, there is nonetheless a big opportunity in
front of us.  Let’s look at the important economic forces that will be at work in the coming
years and look for the strategic moves that should be considered at the producer level.
THE SUPPLY SIDE CYCLE
The January 1 cattle inventory was at 96.1 million head in 2003.  It is likely to be
down again on January 1, 2004.  Poor pasture and hay conditions have killed producers’
interests in holding back heifers and the record prices in the second half of the year, coming
with the closing of the Canadian border, have made it hard to hold heifers.  We are at or near
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s numbers, and I think the next direction is up as we start
heifer holding during 2004.  Figure 1 shows the numbers.
Livestock Marketing Information Center
Data Source:  USDA/NASS
Figure 1.  January 1 Total Cattle Inventory
As the herd expands, per capita consumption of beef will decline because per capita
supplies will decline.  The USDA is projecting 62.2 pounds per capita in 2004, and we will
see numbers in the low 60’s for several years starting in 2005.  Some loss of market share
will result, but this is not always a negative.  We have to go through that dip in per capita
consumption to get heifers into the breeding herd and establish a base for a bigger industry to
regain market share as we move toward 2010.
Expand your herds if you have the resources.  Look for bred heifers
and cow-calf pairs to generate cash flow quicker.  Improve genetics
in the process.  Check out the price grids and vertical alliance
premium programs, and move quality and size of cattle toward
what the new, more consumer-driven marketplace wants.
DEMAND
After declining for 20 consecutive years, demand for beef bottomed in 1998
(www.aaec.vt.edu/rilp for yearly demand index for beef).  Table 1 shows quarterly demand
indexes for beef with 1980 as the baseline.  Note the 1998 numbers were near 50 which
suggest a cumulative 50 percent decline in demand after 1980.  The index has also been
converted to 1998=100, so changes since the bottom in 1998 can be read directly from the
index.  The 116.492 for quarter 3 of 2003 is preliminary until final data on prices and per
capita consumption are in, but the index is saying demand has increased 16.5 percent since
the bottom in 1998.  CattleFax has said demand increases like those we saw in 1999, 2000
and 2001 added $40 to $50 per head each year to fed cattle calves.  After a brief slide in 2002
due to lagged fallout from 9/11/01 and the BSE problem in Japan, the 2003 numbers are up
sharply from 2002 and from 2001.
The demand increases are coming from a number of sources.  But the improved
product offering as the big packers moved away from a business model of being low-cost
commodity operators and spent money on developing new branded and quality-assured
product lines was huge in its importance to cow-calf producers.  Since 1995, I believe the
expenditures on new product development and promotion by the big 3 packers are in the
billions.  The check off funds in recent years have been focused on being a catalyst and
encouraging new products like the steak sandwich in all Dairy Queen outlets.  Consumers
have paid for a better product offering both domestically and in the international markets.
The key to long run viability and the chances to make a profit are
demand.  We need to see a continued aggressive pace in packer-
level investments in new consumer-friendly product lines.  Any
market intervention that threatens those investments should be
made with care.
There are papers on various types of market interventions, including this year’s
“Packer Ban” legislation, at www.aaec.vt.edu/rilp home page.  Under the “Publications” tab,
there is also a brief paper by Feuz et al. in the spring of 2002 that explores some of the
possible unanticipated implications of market interventions.  I have major concerns that well-
intended legislative initiatives could end up hurting producers due to unanticipated negative
implications, and I urge caution in efforts to legislate solutions to economic problems.
Table 1.  Quarterly Beef Index for 1980-2003 
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
Year 1980=100 1998=100 Year 1980=100 1998=100 Year 1980=100 1998=100 Year 1980=100 1998=100
1980 100.000 208.336 1980 100.000 188.619 1980 100.000 195.550 1980 100.000 203.752
1981 93.750 195.315 1981 92.901 175.230 1981 101.814 199.097 1981 88.691 180.710
1982 83.420 173.794 1982 90.391 170.495 1982 93.253 182.356 1982 84.881 172.947
1983 82.855 172.618 1983 90.189 170.113 1983 90.941 177.836 1983 81.008 165.056
1984 82.052 170.945 1984 85.929 162.078 1984 82.801 161.918 1984 81.029 165.098
1985 76.309 158.980 1985 85.232 160.764 1985 82.910 162.130 1985 73.105 148.954
1986 72.059 150.125 1986 81.649 154.005 1986 81.413 159.204 1986 71.490 145.663
1987 66.917 139.412 1987 73.815 139.229 1987 74.090 144.884 1987 66.829 136.166
1988 67.028 139.644 1988 73.976 139.533 1988 72.448 141.673 1988 64.780 131.991
1989 63.242 131.756 1989 69.344 130.797 1989 66.528 130.096 1989 64.197 130.802
1990 60.926 126.930 1990 69.910 131.863 1990 65.575 128.233 1990 62.930 128.222
1991 60.385 125.803 1991 67.835 127.951 1991 64.588 126.303 1991 58.533 119.263
1992 57.207 119.183 1992 63.496 119.766 1992 60.843 118.978 1992 56.362 114.839
1993 55.818 116.290 1993 61.711 116.399 1993 59.951 117.235 1993 55.435 112.950
1994 54.459 113.459 1994 59.364 111.971 1994 56.891 111.250 1994 53.733 109.482
1995 52.765 109.930 1995 57.729 108.888 1995 57.320 112.089 1995 52.830 107.642
1996 52.470 109.314 1996 56.953 107.424 1996 52.848 103.344 1996 50.847 103.601
1997 48.373 100.779 1997 54.416 102.639 1997 51.625 100.953 1997 48.606 99.036
1998 47.999 100.000 1998 53.017 100.000 1998 51.138 100.000 1998 49.079 100.000
1999 47.682 99.340 1999 55.053 103.841 1999 53.178 103.989 1999 51.483 104.897
2000 50.428 105.059 2000 56.579 106.720 2000 55.635 108.795 2000 51.413 104.755
2001 52.339 109.041 2001 59.888 112.960 2001 57.357 112.161 2001 54.799 111.655
2002 51.760 107.834 2002 59.795 112.786 2002 55.944 109.398 2002 53.844 109.709
2003 53.371 111.191 2003 61.491 115.984 2003 59.571 116.492    
TRADE
The U.S. is a major exporter and importer of beef.  Export volume is equivalent to
about 9 percent of domestic production with beef and veal exports in the 2.25 to 2.50 billion
lb. range from 1999 through 2003.  Imports in recent years have been in the 3.0 to 3.3 billion
lb. range and are from 10 to 12 percent of domestic production equivalent.  Figures 2 and 3
record the data.
Livestock Marketing Information Center
Figure 2.  U.S. Beef & Veal Exports
As a Percentage of Production, Carcass Weight, Annual
Livestock Marketing Information Center
Figure 3.  U.S. Beef & Veal Imports
As a Percentage of Production, Carcass Weight, Annual
Generally, we export high quality cuts of beef and import processing beef.  Top
buyers for beef exports are Japan, Mexico, Canada and South Korea.  We buy beef from
Australia, New Zealand and Argentina and live cattle from Canada and Mexico.  The
dramatic and record high prices this year came primarily from the abrupt closing of the
Canadian border which eliminated roughly 9 percent of the available numbers of slaughter
cattle.  The record prices were from a supply-side phenomenon, not a surge in demand.
From September 2002 through September 2003, slaughter cattle prices in Nebraska were up
40 percent and Choice boxed beef values were up 41 percent.  Across the same period, retail
prices were up about 12 percent.  During October and November, as the price increases
worked up through the supply chain to food stores and restaurants, the record prices faltered
and settled in around the 18 to 20 percent price increase we would expect from a 9 percent
decrease in supply with demand constant.  (Elasticity of demand is about -0.5 at the producer
level, meaning a 9 percent decrease in supply will prompt an 18 percent increase in price if
demand is constant.)
Trade is controversial in some quarters, but the growth in export markets for beef has
been one of the reasons for the bottoming and subsequent surge in beef demand.  Research
that tries to account for the influences of both exports and imports shows that growth in
exports has increased beef and cattle prices and supported a larger beef cattle industry than
would otherwise be the case.  (Impact of Exports on the U.S. Beef Industry, E. Van Enoo, E.
Peterson, W. Purcell, May 2000 at www.aaec.vt.edu/rilp under Publications.)  The most
recent data show beef export values at about $5.5 billion with import values close to $3.5
billion.  Shipping high value beef cuts into the world market helps the domestic industry in
net, even though the pounds we import are larger than the pounds we export.
Trade is often controversial, but the research shows a positive net
benefit.  We need to see the “forest” here and not get caught seeing
only the “trees” like imports of cattle from Mexico and Canada.
The high value cuts being exported were, according to my research,
a significant factor in the turnaround of beef demand in 1998.
MARKET INTERVENTIONS
Efforts by Congress to legislate solutions to actual or perceived economic problems
will influence the type of beef industry we will have in the future, will make a significant
difference in the growth and economic vitality of the industry, and will impact producer-level
profitability and viability.  The non-price means of coordination and quality control that have
emerged to replace the failed pricing system are controversial.  If I had my druthers, we
would have a price-driven industry with grades that identify and measure all important
product attributes (like tenderness) that influence consumers’ buying behavior.  The system
might then send clear price signals and economic incentives to producers to keep what we are
producing in line with what consumers want and are willing to pay for.  The price system we
have is not capable of bringing that type of coordination and quality control.
If we pass laws that make it hard for packers to buy the cattle or hogs they need to
support the new branded product lines, we run the risk that they will stop investing big
dollars in product development work—and that would be deadly for producers.  There is no
doubt in my mind that the new pre-cooked beef lines that can go through the microwave are a
major reason for the turnaround in beef demand.  We risk discouraging those efforts when we
try to legislate behavior in our concentrated markets.
There are issues in concentrated markets that are no longer relying on the price
system for coordination.  Market access is an issue, especially for the independent-thinking
producers who do not want to change their genetics and management programs to meet the
needs of these new branded product lines.  Maybe it will all work out.  If we go after the non-
price approaches that have the incentives wrong, like the formula arrangements with a base
price from a market where the packers are active buyers, perhaps we can find a compromise
that moves us forward.  As noted earlier, there is a set of 2003 papers on market interventions
including Coventry of Origin Labeling, Mandatory Price Reporting, and Packer Ban at
www.aaec.vt.edu/rilp.  When Congress intervenes and requires new programs that add costs
along the supply chain, producer prices will go down unless the new program or new
legislated requirement can add more value than the programs cost on a per head basis.
Mandatory price reporting may be an example of a cost-increasing program that did little or
nothing to enhance producers’ prices, and COOL may be another one.
Do read the papers that try to lay out these issues and what we know from a research
perspective.  My advice is to be well informed and to pay close attention to the unanticipated
consequences of market interventions.  A classic example for me would be banning vertical
alliances and contractual procurement in cattle or in hogs and realizing later that it cost the
producing sector the billions of dollars spent by the big packers on new product
development.  The alliances and contracts have allowed higher levels of inter-stage
coordination and quality control, and the expanded investments came with that newly-found
quality control.
Be very careful with market interventions.  Cow-calf producers
need investments in new product forms from the large packers.  If
you pass laws that tend to discourage those investments, the
demand growth we are seeing will falter in future years.  The
residual claimant of the consumer dollar (the producer), after all
middlemen extract an operating margin, will bear the price pain if
demand is allowed to falter.
LOOKING AHEAD AT THE BIG PICTURE
When the volatility in 2003 from an unprecedented set of circumstances settles out,
the beef business can be facing a positive future.  If we do the right things and do not shoot
ourselves in the foot, the next 5-6 years can be good years for the beef cow owner.  Let’s
look at some of the things that need to be done.
Be Consumer Driven:  The only dollars available to be allocated to the profit centers along
the supply chain are the dollars out of the consumer’s pocket.  The only way to increase the
size of the economic pie is to offer a product line that will pull more dollars out of those
pockets.
Across the past 20-25 years, the price-driven system has failed miserably in efforts to
meet this need.  In the 1980’s, some of us were bemoaning the wrong signals that were being
sent when an entire pen of cattle was sold at the same price.  There are always big differences
in value within that pen, and the need was to get to individual animal evaluation and pricing,
but we did not go that way.  The change was, instead, to selling the entire show list at one
price, and that was a step backwards.  Selling everything at one price does not send a profit-
based message for change in the form of price premiums or discounts to the producer.
The industry may get help here, in spite of its own tendencies, by the development of
an individual animal ID system.  For disease and security reasons, we may go to individual
animal identification and record keeping which will meet the necessary conditions for a
producer to figure out how well his or her cattle are meeting consumer level needs.  If we add
an understanding of how critically important it is to serve the consumer, the historically huge
divide between what we offer and what the consumer wants might be further reduced.  We
know consumers want high quality, consistent and positive eating expenses and a beef entrée
that is easy and convenient to prepare.  If those wants are met, the consumer will reward the
sector in general, and producers in particular, by pouring more dollars into the marketplace.
Take Advantage of Opportunities:  The herd building phase of the cycle will come.  As new
investments in breeding stock are made, it is important that genetics be moved toward what
has commercial value along the supply chain and up to the consumer.  Until the scientists get
control of tenderness in the genetics, it will be important to identify the right slaughter date
and weight for the steer or heifer.  Slaughter before the animal is able to get into Choice is a
costly mistake for some breeds, and slaughter after the animal is past the point on the growth
curve where conversions take a big dip can be very costly.
Independent cattle and hog producers complain to me on occasion that the big packer
does not appear to very interested in their slaughter livestock.  This scenario plays out more
often in hogs than in cattle, but there is a message for all livestock producers.  It goes
something like this:
“They don’t appear to want my hogs.”
and I ask:
“Are they uniform and consistent?”
and the reply is:
“They are like peas in a pod and are very uniform.”
and I ask:
“What if they are uniformly wrong?”
At that point, there is a sometimes prolonged sentence.  If the load is in fact uniformly
wrong in terms of weight, size of the loin or for a number of other product attribute reasons,
the packer/processor has a major problem.  They might have to essentially develop another
marketing and product line program or just sell the pork (or beef) as a commodity product
because the hogs or cattle do not fit the new branded product line the packer is emphasizing
in its new business plan.
We will have a chance to grow the beef sector and regain part of the lost market share
that went from 95 lbs. per capita in 1976 to 65 lbs. and lower in the early 1990’s if the
consumer is well served.  Support state and national programs that help make sure this is the
case.
Have an Open Mind:  It is useful to think about the beef business as if it were a single firm,
and you were the manager.  Assume you did own the industry, and you spend scarce
investment dollars on a new and branded fresh beef product line.  Then you find the
performance of the line is too variable.  The problem is that the slaughter cattle you are
producing do not consistently support your new, consumer-driven product line in terms of
tenderness, or portion size, or some other product characteristic.  As owner and manager of
the “firm,” what do you do?
You will get your management team together and fix the problem of quality and
performance variation.  The obvious need is to get the variability in the cattle under control,
and you do that by laying out detailed specs and expect the production department to grow
you the right types of cattle.  That coordination and quality control is exactly what is needed
in the marketplace of today if packer or processor or retailer money is to be spent on new
products.
Managing the new approaches such as vertical alliances is not easy, even if your view
of the industry as a single firm helps to identify the issues.  There is a paper on management
and compensation guidelines (Purcell, Wayne D. and William T. Hudson.  “Risk Sharing and
Compensation Guides for Managers and Members of Vertical Beef Alliances,” Review of
Agricultural Economics, (2003) 25(1): 44-65).  There is an early version of this paper from
August 2001 under “Publications” at www.aaec.vt.edu/rilp.  That work surfaced an important
issue, and I will close with it as I share new insights on this important issue.
In the alliances, what used to be separate profit centers (producers, cattle feeding,
packing, retailing) are now working together.  Often, major new investments by one or more
of the new “partners” are required.  Examples would be scanning technology in the feedlot to
find the correct slaughter date for each animal or electrical stimulation to ensure tenderness
in the slaughtering and fabricating phase.  These technologies have few alternative uses and
there is, therefore, suddenly very strong interest in the performance of every member of the
new team.  To get involved and to make the needed investments, there may need to be more
formalized (contract, marketing agreement, production contract) arrangements to lay out
responsibilities and compensation.  The price system may not be adequate, especially if there
should be compensation for contributing to the team effort cattle and providing product
attributes that are not identified in the current pricing system.  It is relatively clear in this
setting why the price system has been abandoned.  If it is to make a comeback, there needs to
be major changes in quality grades and in other value-related dimensions so it can be
effective and correctly reward the costly new investments.  If changes are not made, then we
need to be careful in insisting on a return to “competitive” price driven systems.  We could
lose the willingness of for-profit business firms to make investments in new technology that
will be needed to carry the beef industry into the future.
